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Hong Kong’s Judiciary under ‘One Country, Two Systems’ 
 
Albert H.Y. Chen and P.Y. Lo 
 
Hong Kong, formerly a British colony and since 1997 a Special Administrative Region 
(HKSAR) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under the constitutional formula of ‘One 
Country, Two Systems’, has a judicial system that is much more highly evaluated, trusted and 
respected internationally and locally than its counterpart in mainland China. The colonial judicial 
system in Hong Kong, though modelled on the common law system in England, did not always 
fully guarantee the litigant’s right to a fair hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal,1 
but at least the normative ideals of the Rule of Law and judicial independence were implanted on 
Hong Kong soil during the colonial era. Such ideals have remained alive and well, and more 
cherished and vigorously defended than ever before, after Hong Kong was re-unified with China 
in 1997. Under the Hong Kong Basic Law – the HKSAR’s constitutional instrument that was 
enacted by the PRC’s National People’s Congress in 1990 and came into effect in 1997 – Hong 
Kong enjoys a high degree of autonomy, and its pre-existing legal and judicial systems have 
largely remained intact, except, for instance, that a new Court of Final Appeal was established, 
which exercises the power of final adjudication in Hong Kong cases – a power formerly 
exercised by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London.   
This chapter provides an overview of the Hong Kong Judiciary, particularly those aspects 
of the judicial system that are relevant to the independence, impartiality and integrity of the 
courts and their judges. The chapter consists of the following sections: (1) the structure of the 
judicial system; (2) judicial features of ‘One Country, Two Systems’; (3) appointment and 
conditions of service of judges; (4) rules of bias and recusal; (5) contempt of court by 
‘scandalising the court’; (6) judges and free speech; (7) judges and non-judicial functions. These 
sections will be followed by a concluding section.  
The structure of the judicial system2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Cottrell	  and	  Ghai:	  ‘for	  most	  of	  Hong	  Kong’s	  history,	  litigants	  had	  little	  guarantee	  of	  a	  “fair	  and	  
public	  hearing	  by	  a	  competent,	  independent	  and	  impartial	  tribunal”	  [International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  
Rights,	  art.	  14].	  Judicial	  independence	  was	  not	  a	  hallmark	  of	  colonial	  rule’:	  Jill	  Cottrell	  and	  Yash	  Ghai,	  ‘Between	  two	  
systems	  of	  law:	  The	  judiciary	  in	  Hong	  Kong’,	  in	  Peter	  H	  Russell	  and	  David	  M	  O’Brien	  (eds),	  Judicial	  Independence	  in	  
the	  Age	  of	  Democracy	  (University	  Press	  of	  Virginia	  2001)	  207-­‐232.	  For	  a	  critical	  account	  of	  the	  deficiencies	  of	  
colonial	  justice	  from	  an	  insider’s	  perspective,	  see	  Marjorie	  Chui,	  Justice	  Without	  Fear	  or	  Favour:	  Reflections	  of	  a	  
Chinese	  Magistrate	  in	  Colonial	  Hong	  Kong	  (Ming	  Pao	  Publications	  Ltd	  1999).	  See	  also	  a	  book	  by	  a	  former	  judge,	  
Benjamin	  T	  M	  Liu,	  How	  are	  We	  Judged?	  (City	  University	  of	  Hong	  Kong	  Press	  2000).	  
2	  This	  section	  draws	  on	  the	  previous	  work	  of	  one	  of	  the	  co-­‐authors,	  P	  Y	  Lo,	  ‘Hong	  Kong:	  Common	  Law	  Courts	  in	  
China’	  in	  Jiunn-­‐rong	  Yeh	  and	  Wen-­‐Chen	  Chang	  (eds),	  Asian	  Courts	  in	  Context	  (Cambridge	  UP	  2015)	  chap	  5.	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Under the Basic Law, the HKSAR is vested with independent judicial power, including 
that of final adjudication.3  Hong Kong courts exercise the judicial power of the HKSAR and 
adjudicate cases in accordance with the laws applicable in the HKSAR, which are the Basic Law, 
the laws previously in force in Hong Kong, the laws enacted by the legislature of the HKSAR,4 
and a number of national laws of the PRC made applicable to the HKSAR.5 The power of final 
adjudication is vested in the Court of Final Appeal (CFA), which may as required invite judges 
from other common law jurisdictions to sit on the Court.6  The HKSAR courts are authorised by 
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) ‘to interpret on their own, 
in adjudicating cases, the provisions of [the Basic Law] which are within the limits of the 
autonomy of’ the HKSAR, and to interpret other provisions of the Basic Law as well, subject to 
the procedure of judicial reference to the NPCSC with regard to the interpretation of certain 
provisions of the Basic Law.7 Hong Kong courts may refer to precedents of other common law 
jurisdictions.8 Judicial power shall be exercised by the HKSAR courts independently without any 
interference.9 
Hong Kong’s judicial system largely follows that of the common law tradition. There is a 
hierarchical system of courts with the CFA serving as the apex ‘supreme court’. The Chief 
Justice of the CFA is designated as the head of the Judiciary of the HKSAR and is charged with 
the administration of the Judiciary.10 Figure 1 shows the structure of the HKSAR courts and their 
hierarchical relationship by way of appeals. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  	  Basic	  Law	  of	  the	  HKSAR,	  Arts	  2,	  19,	  82	  and	  85.	  	  
4	  	  Ibid,	  Art	  8.	  	  
5	  	  Ibid,	  Art	  18.	  	  
6	  Ibid,	  Art	  82.	  	  
7	  Ibid,	  Art	  158.	  
8	  	  Ibid,	  Art	  84.	  
9	  	  Ibid,	  Art	  85.	  	  
10	  	  See	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  484	  of	  the	  Laws	  of	  Hong	  Kong)	  s	  6(1A).	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            Civil jurisdiction is exercised at first instance before a number of courts and tribunals, 
depending mainly on the monetary value of the claim and the nature of the claim. The Court of 
First Instance (CFI) of the High Court is a superior court of record of unlimited jurisdiction in 
civil causes and matters.11 The District Court is a court of record of limited jurisdiction in civil 
causes and matters.12 First instance hearings or trials in civil cases are normally heard by a court 
consisting of one judge (in the District Court or the CFI).13  
 Criminal proceedings begin in the magistrates’ courts, which handle pre-trial proceedings, 
including whether the defendant should be granted bail or be detained. Criminal cases (excluding 
homicide) involving a defendant who is a juvenile below the age of 16 are tried by the juvenile 
court presided by a magistrate.14 Trial in criminal cases may take place before a magistrate, in 
the District Court or CFI upon the application or choice of venue of the prosecution. Different 
levels of criminal courts have different sentencing powers, with the CFI having unlimited 
criminal jurisdiction, including the power to sentence a defendant to life imprisonment.15  
Criminal trials are heard and determined by a magistrate or a District Judge sitting alone 
or a Judge of the CFI sitting with a jury,16 depending on the level of court to which the criminal 
case is applied for, transferred or committed for trial.  
 Appeals from decisions of a magistrate are heard in the CFI.17 Appeals from decisions of 
the District Court or the CFI are heard in the Court of Appeal (CA) of the High Court.18 In the 
CA, appeals are generally heard by a bench of three judges.19 Appeals from the judgments of the 
CA, and from the judgments of the CFI on magistracy appeals, are heard and determined by the 
CFA.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  	  See	  the	  High	  Court	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  4)	  s	  3(2).	  	  
12	  The	  District	  Court	  incorporates	  the	  Family	  Court.	  	  
13	  	  See	  the	  High	  Court	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  4)	  s	  32(1)	  and	  the	  District	  Court	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  336)	  s	  6.	  Other	  provisions	  of	  
the	  High	  Court	  Ordinance	  empower	  the	  CFI	  to	  hear	  first	  instance	  cases	  by	  a	  court	  consisting	  of	  a	  judge	  sitting	  with	  
a	  jury	  or	  an	  assessor.	  
14	  	  See	  the	  Juvenile	  Offenders	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  226).	  	  
15	  	  See	  the	  High	  Court	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  4)	  s	  3(2).	  	  
16	  A	  jury	  sitting	  in	  criminal	  trials	  on	  indictment	  before	  the	  High	  Court	  consist	  of	  7	  jurors	  in	  ordinary	  cases.	  This	  can	  
be	  expanded	  to	  9	  jurors	  in	  long	  cases.	  The	  jury	  system	  was	  introduced	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  in	  1845.	  Provisions	  for	  juries	  
are	  now	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Jury	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  2).	  	  
17	  	  See	  the	  Magistrates	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  227)	  ss	  104,	  113.	  	  
18	  	  See	  the	  High	  Court	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  4)	  ss	  13,	  14,	  14AA;	  the	  District	  Court	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  336)	  ss	  63,	  83,	  84;	  and	  
the	  Criminal	  Procedure	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  221)	  ss	  81,	  81A,	  81D,	  81E,	  81F,	  82.	  
19	  	  There	  are	  also	  provisions	  for	  a	  bench	  of	  two	  judges	  or	  a	  single	  Justice	  of	  Appeal	  handling	  interlocutory	  appeals	  
in	  a	  civil	  matter,	  appeals	  against	  sentences	  in	  a	  criminal	  case	  and	  applications	  for	  leave	  to	  appeal.	  See	  the	  High	  
Court	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  4)	  ss	  34,	  34A,	  34B,	  35.	  	  
5	  
	  
In the CFA, final appeals20 are heard by a bench of five judges, consisting of the Chief 
Justice who presides (or, if he is not available, another Permanent Judge), two or three 
Permanent Judges and one or two of the Non-Permanent Judges (NPJ) drawn from one or both of 
two lists of NPJs – one consisting of NPJs from Hong Kong and the other from other common 
law jurisdictions.21	  NPJs appointed under the latter list have included serving or retired judges of 
the highest court in England, and retired judges of the highest courts in Australia and New 
Zealand. Although this is not required by law, Chief Justice Andrew Li, the first Chief Justice of 
the HKSAR, established a convention that the five-member CFA bench hearing an appeal would 
almost invariably (in over 90% of the cases) include one visiting NPJ from overseas.22 Such 
NPJs participate actively in the CFA’s work and in developing the CFA’s jurisprudence;23 they 
have written lead judgments on behalf of the court in approximately one quarter of all cases 
heard by it in 1997-2010.24 The presence of these distinguished jurists from the common law 
world has served to enhance the CFA’s international reputation and facilitated transnational 
judicial dialogue.25 It also testifies to the vibrancy of judicial independence in Hong Kong, as 
these distinguished jurists would not have accepted appointment to the court if they had no 
confidence in judicial independence in Hong Kong or had doubt about the integrity and 
reputation of Hong Kong’s judicial system.26  
As regards the language in which the court system operates, the Basic Law provides that 
both Chinese and English are official languages.27 Legislation in Hong Kong is bilingual, but the 
judgments of most of the cases cited before the courts are in English. The majority of judges and 
magistrates in Hong Kong are bilingual,28 but there is still a significant minority of expatriate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  These	  should	  be	  distinguished	  from	  applications	  for	  leave	  to	  appeal,	  which	  are	  dealt	  with	  by	  the	  Appeal	  
Committee	  of	  the	  CFA	  consisting	  of	  a	  panel	  of	  three	  judges	  (be	  it	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  2	  Permanent	  Judges	  or	  3	  
Permanent	  Judges).	  
21	  	  See	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  484)	  s	  16.	  NPJs	  from	  Hong	  Kong	  have	  included	  retired	  
Permanent	  Judges	  of	  the	  CFA	  itself,	  and	  retired	  or	  serving	  judges	  of	  the	  CA.	  The	  appointment	  of	  a	  list	  of	  NPJs	  from	  
another	  common	  law	  jurisdiction	  gives	  effect	  to	  Art	  85	  of	  the	  Basic	  Law	  and	  is	  an	  important	  feature	  of	  the	  system	  
of	  courts	  of	  the	  HKSAR.	  
22	  Simon	  N	  M	  Young	  et	  al,	  ‘Role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice’	  in	  Simon	  N	  M	  Young	  and	  Yash	  Ghai	  (eds),	  Hong	  Kong’s	  Court	  of	  
Final	  Appeal	  (Cambridge	  UP	  2014)	  225	  at	  231.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  five-­‐member	  bench	  
in	  each	  case	  heard	  by	  the	  CFA	  (as	  well	  as	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  Appeal	  Committee	  of	  the	  CFA	  which	  hears	  
applications	  for	  leave	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  CFA)	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  (CJ)	  (ibid,	  230).	  The	  CJ	  usually	  
allocates	  the	  responsibility	  for	  writing	  the	  lead	  judgment	  of	  a	  CFA	  decision:	  Simon	  N	  M	  Young	  et	  al,	  ‘The	  Judges’	  in	  
Young	  and	  Ghai	  (ibid),	  253	  at	  260.	  	  
23	  Danny	  Gittings,	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  Basic	  Law	  (Hong	  Kong	  University	  Press	  2013)	  192-­‐3.	  
24	  This	  was	  revealed	  by	  a	  book-­‐length	  study	  of	  the	  CFA	  during	  the	  term	  of	  office	  of	  CJ	  Andrew	  Li	  (1997-­‐2010):	  
Young	  and	  Ghai	  (n	  22	  above)	  261,	  263.	  
25	  See	  P	  Y	  Lo,	  ‘The	  Impact	  of	  CFA	  Jurisprudence	  Beyond	  Hong	  Kong’	  (2010)	  (8)	  Hong	  Kong	  Lawyer	  36-­‐41.	  
26	  See	  William	  Waung	  (retired	  judge	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Hong	  Kong),	  ‘Judicial	  Independence	  in	  Hong	  Kong’,	  
Standnews,	  5	  Aug	  2015	  <https://www.thestandnews.com/politics/judicial-­‐independence-­‐in-­‐hong-­‐kong/>	  accessed	  
27	  Feb	  2016;	  Michael	  Skapinker,	  ‘Hong	  Kong	  Law:	  A	  Trial	  for	  Wig	  and	  Gown’,	  Financial	  Times,	  22	  July	  2015.	  	  
27	  Basic	  Law,	  Art	  9.	  
28	  Hong	  Kong	  Judiciary	  (published	  by	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  Judiciary	  in	  2008)	  33.	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judges.  The majority of the trials in the magistrates’ courts and tribunals are conducted in 
Chinese (Cantonese).29  Most of the judgments of the higher courts have been written in English. 
In particular, all CFA judgments have been written in English, with official Chinese translations 
produced subsequently in respect of selected judgments. 
 
Size of the courts30  
At the time of writing, the CFA consists of the Chief Justice, 3 Permanent Judges, 4 NPJs 
from Hong Kong (who are retired judges of the CFA and the CA) and 10 NPJs who are serving 
or retired judges of the highest courts in the UK, Australia and New Zealand.  
 The High Court consists of the CA and the CFI. It is headed by the Chief Judge of the 
High Court. The CA has 12 Justices of Appeal, 3 of whom hold the title of Vice-President of the 
CA.31 There are 25 Judges of the CFI. There are also 9 Recorders of the CFI, who are senior 
members of the Bar appointed for a fixed term on the condition that they will set aside a month 
or so every year to sit in the CFI as a judge.32  
 The District Court consists of the Chief District Judge, the Principal Family Court Judge 
and 35 District Judges.  
 There are 7 magistrates’ courts in different localities of Hong Kong. Each magistrates’ 
court is headed by a principal magistrate. There are 82 magistrates, including the Chief 
Magistrate, 8 Principal Magistrates, 60 Permanent Magistrates and 11 Special Magistrates.33 
Judicial officers of the magistrate rank staff the Coroner’s Court, the Small Claims Tribunal, the 
Labour Tribunal and the Obscene Articles Tribunal.  
 Apart from the above judges and judicial officers of the permanent establishment, the 
Chief Justice has been empowered by statute34 to appoint from time to time and as the needs of 
judicial work requires, deputy judges of the CFI, deputy judges of the District Court and deputy 
magistrates, as well as temporary members of the High Court and District Court registries, the 
Lands Tribunal, the Small Claims Tribunal and the Labour Tribunal, for a specified duration of 
time. Deputy judges or magistrates are usually appointed from retired or former members of the 
Judiciary, or from the lower ranks of Judiciary (‘seconded’ to serve on a higher court), or from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Ibid	  33.	  
30	  The	  figures	  below	  represent	  the	  position	  on	  3	  February	  2016:	  see	  the	  list	  of	  judges	  and	  judicial	  officers,	  
<http://www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/organization/judges.htm>	  accessed	  13	  Feb	  2016.	  
31	  A	  judge	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  First	  Instance	  may,	  on	  the	  request	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice,	  sit	  as	  an	  additional	  judge	  of	  the	  
Court	  of	  Appeal:	  see	  High	  Court	  Ordinance,	  s	  5(2).	  	  
32	  High	  Court	  Ordinance,	  s	  6A.	  See	  also	  the	  section	  below	  on	  temporary,	  part-­‐time	  or	  ‘non-­‐regular’	  judges.	  
33	  	  Special	  magistrates,	  who	  need	  not	  be	  qualified	  solicitors	  or	  barristers,	  are	  appointed	  as	  a	  separate	  rank	  in	  the	  
Judiciary	  establishment.	  They	  have	  no	  power	  to	  sentence	  defendants	  to	  imprisonment,	  and	  are	  mainly	  deployed	  to	  
handle	  minor	  offences	  such	  as	  traffic	  contraventions,	  hawking,	  and	  littering	  cases.	  	  
34	  High	  Court	  Ordinance,	  s	  10;	  District	  Court	  Ordinance,	  s	  7;	  Magistrates	  Ordinance,	  s	  5A;	  Small	  Claims	  Tribunal	  
Ordinance,	  s	  4A;	  Labour	  Tribunal	  Ordinance,	  s	  5A.	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members of the legal profession in private practice. The issue of having such ‘non-regular’ 
judges as part of the Hong Kong judiciary will be discussed in another section of this chapter.  
The Annual Reports of the Judiciary of the HKSAR since 199735 have appendices on the 
caseload and case disposal of all levels of courts and tribunals, as well as the average waiting 
times for a case to be tried or heard, referenced against target waiting times set by the Judiciary.  
 
Judicial features of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ 
 The general perception in Hong Kong that the level of the Rule of Law, judicial 
independence and human rights protection in mainland China is considerably lower than in Hong 
Kong has given rise to what the co-authors of this chapter would call the ‘Hong Kong syndrome 
of One Country Two Systems’.  By this term we refer to the phenomenon that whenever any 
action is taken, or any statement, remark or comment is made, with regard to Hong Kong on the 
part of mainland authorities (or even scholars believed to reflect the views of the mainland 
authorities) that seems to pose a threat to, or to deviate from, the principles and values of Hong 
Kong’s existing legal and judicial systems, public opinion and the mass media in Hong Kong 
(particularly the ‘pan-democrats’ among Hong Kong’s politicians,36 and professional bodies of 
the legal community such as the Hong Kong Bar Association) would react strongly against it, 
criticising it and thereby defending the cherished principles and values of Hong Kong’s legal 
system.  This syndrome is relevant to the understanding of the judicial features of ‘One Country, 
Two Systems’. 
 The most controversial event in the legal and judicial history of the HKSAR so far was 
the reference by the Government to the NPCSC for interpretation of the Basic Law after the CFA 
rendered its decisions in early 1999 in the cases of Ng Ka Ling37 and Chan Kam Nga38 on the 
right of abode in and migration to Hong Kong of Mainland-born children of Hong Kong 
permanent residents.39 The Government estimated that the CFA’s interpretation of the relevant 
Basic Law provisions would result in 1.67 million Mainland residents being entitled to migrate 
to Hong Kong in the next ten years. Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa requested the Central 
People’s Government in Beijing to invite the NPCSC to exercise its power to interpret (or ‘re-
interpret’) the Basic Law, which the NPCSC did in June 1999, overruling the CFA’s 
interpretation. Under article 158 of the Basic Law, the NPCSC’s interpretation did not have the 
effect of reversing the CFA’s judgments or orders in the Ng and Chan cases; it only means that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  	  <www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/publications/publications.htm>	  accessed	  20	  Mar	  2016.	  See	  also	  the	  annual	  
Controlling	  Officer’s	  Report:	  Head	  80	  –	  Judiciary,	  which	  forms	  part	  of	  the	  expenditure	  analysis	  of	  the	  General	  
Revenue	  Account	  of	  the	  Estimates	  in	  the	  Annual	  Government	  Budget,	  eg	  
<www.budget.gov.hk/2015/eng/pdf/head080.pdf>	  accessed	  20	  Mar	  2016.	  	  
36	  There	  are	  basically	  two	  camps	  in	  the	  political	  scene	  of	  the	  HKSAR	  –	  the	  ‘pan-­‐democrats’	  (sometimes	  called	  ‘the	  
opposition’)	  and	  the	  ‘pro-­‐Establishment’	  or	  ‘pro-­‐China’	  camp.	  	  
37	  (1999)	  2	  HKCFAR	  4.	  
38	  (1999)	  2	  HKCFAR	  82.	  
39	  See	  generally	  Johannes	  Chan	  et	  al	  (eds),	  Hong	  Kong’s	  Constitutional	  Debate	  (Hong	  Kong	  University	  Press	  2000).	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Hong Kong courts in future cases must follow the NPCSC’s interpretation instead of the CFA’s 
interpretation of the relevant Basic Law provisions. In Lau Kong Yung,40 the CFA considered the 
effect of the NPCSC interpretation and recognised its binding force. Sir Anthony Mason, former 
Chief Justice of Australia and a NPJ of the CFA, was a member of the CFA bench hearing this 
case; he commented in his concurring judgment as follows: 
‘As is the case with constitutional divisions of power, a link between the courts of the 
[HKSAR] and the institutions of the People’s Republic of China is required. In a nation-wide 
common law system, the link would normally be between the regional courts and the national 
constitutional court or the national supreme court. … In the context of “one country, two 
systems”, Article 158 of the Basic Law provides a very different link. … The Standing 
Committee’s power to interpret laws is necessarily exercised from time to time otherwise than 
in the adjudication of cases.’41 
 Hundreds of members of Hong Kong’s legal community participated in a ‘silent march’ 
in protest against the NPCSC’s interpretation of the Basic Law in June 1999. Subsequently, the 
NPCSC has exercised this power on three other occasions: in 2004, acting on its own initiative 
(instead of at the request of the Chief Executive of the HKSAR), to interpret the Basic Law 
provisions relating to electoral reform; in 2005, upon the request of the Acting Chief Executive 
of the HKSAR, to clarify the term of office of a Chief Executive who succeeds one who resigns 
before completing his term of office; and in 2011, upon a reference by the CFA itself in the 
Congo case42 to the NPCSC of Basic Law provisions relating to foreign affairs, which concerned 
whether the applicable law of foreign sovereign immunity in the HKSAR was the same as that in 
the Mainland. Among all four NPCSC interpretations, only the last interpretation was less 
controversial in Hong Kong.  
 The discourse in Hong Kong on the NPCSC’s power to interpret the Basic Law generally 
tends to treat it as a threat to judicial independence in Hong Kong.43 The better view is that this is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  (1999)	  2	  HKCFAR	  300.	  
41	  Ibid	  at	  344-­‐5.	  
42	  (2011)	  14	  HKCFAR	  95,	  395.	  See	  generally	  ‘Focus:	  The	  Congo	  Case’	  (2011)	  41	  HKLJ	  369-­‐430.	  
43	  In	  an	  article	  entitled	  ‘Hong	  Kong’s	  judicial	  independence	  is	  here	  to	  stay	  –	  as	  long	  as	  “one	  country”	  and	  “two	  
systems”	  are	  both	  fully	  recognised’	  (South	  China	  Morning	  Post,	  25	  Sept	  2015),	  former	  Chief	  Justice	  Andrew	  Li	  
wrote	  as	  follows:	  ‘The	  right	  of	  abode	  episode	  [of	  1999]	  was	  very	  controversial.	  I	  believe	  that	  it	  provided	  a	  salutary	  
experience	  in	  the	  formative	  years	  of	  the	  new	  order.	  The	  episode	  has	  led	  to	  a	  consensus	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  and,	  I	  believe,	  
also	  in	  Beijing	  that	  apart	  from	  an	  interpretation	  of	  an	  excluded	  provision	  made	  on	  a	  judicial	  reference	  by	  the	  court,	  
the	  Standing	  Committee’s	  power	  to	  interpret	  should	  only	  be	  exercised	  in	  the	  most	  exceptional	  circumstances.	  In	  
any	  event,	  as	  I	  have	  publicly	  stated,	  the	  Standing	  Committee	  should	  refrain	  from	  exercising	  its	  power	  to	  override	  a	  
court	  judgment	  in	  Hong	  Kong,	  especially	  one	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal.	  Although	  it	  would	  be	  legally	  valid	  and	  
binding,	  such	  an	  interpretation	  would	  have	  an	  adverse	  effect	  on	  judicial	  independence	  in	  Hong	  Kong.’	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	  Professor	  Peter	  Wesley-­‐Smith	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Hong	  Kong	  wrote	  that	  ‘[t]he	  argument	  that	  judicial	  
independence	  is	  severely	  compromised	  by	  reference	  [in	  1999]	  to	  the	  Standing	  Committee	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  one	  to	  
establish.	  The	  decisions	  of	  the	  CFA	  stand	  and	  the	  rights	  of	  parties	  are	  not	  taken	  away;	  judges	  are	  accustomed	  to	  
being	  overruled,	  and	  even	  if	  the	  CFA	  has	  no	  judicial	  overlord	  it	  would	  respect	  any	  statutory	  change	  to	  the	  law	  it	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a question of judicial authority and judicial autonomy rather than judicial independence, because 
even if, as in the case of the 1999 Interpretation (but not the three subsequent interpretations), the 
NPCSC’s interpretation has the effect of overruling (but not reversing) a judicial decision, this is 
comparable to a higher court overruling a judicial precedent of a lower court in an earlier case, or 
the legislature amending the law which the court has interpreted, the amendment in effect 
overruling the court’s interpretation. There is no doubt that in these two latter situations, no 
question of a threat to judicial independence arises. On the other hand, it is true that if the 
NPCSC were to lose its self-restraint (which it has adhered to so far) and to exercise its power to 
interpret the Basic Law frequently during relevant judicial proceedings or after the Hong Kong 
courts have decided relevant cases, the authority of the Hong Kong courts would be eroded, and 
so will be public confidence in the Rule of Law in Hong Kong as a system of legal rules 
administered impartially by respected courts of law.44  
 Apart from the question of NPCSC interpretations, the following widely publicised 
statements on the part of PRC officials or scholars in recent years have also touched the nerves 
of the Hong Kong legal community and provoked verbal reactions from various commentators 
and, in one case, another ‘silent march’. The statements were widely discussed in the media in 
Hong Kong. The counter-statements of the Hong Kong Bar Association mentioned in the table 
below may be said to reflect the sentiments of a significant number of people in Hong Kong who 
are concerned about issues of the Rule of Law and judicial independence.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
pronounced.’	  (‘Judicial	  autonomy	  under	  Hong	  Kong’s	  Basic	  Law’,	  in	  Robert	  Ash	  et	  al	  (eds),	  Hong	  Kong	  in	  Transition:	  
One	  Country,	  Two	  Systems	  (RoutledgeCurzon	  2003)	  161-­‐174	  at	  170;	  emphasis	  in	  original.)	  
44	  As	  pointed	  out	  by	  Sir	  Anthony	  Mason	  (‘The	  Rule	  of	  Law	  in	  the	  Shadow	  of	  the	  Giant:	  The	  Hong	  Kong	  Experience’	  
(2011)	  33	  Sydney	  Law	  Review	  623	  at	  625,	  643),	  ‘Where	  the	  power	  of	  final	  interpretation	  is	  exercised	  by	  a	  body	  
other	  than	  the	  courts,	  conformity	  with	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  will	  depend	  upon	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  power,	  the	  character	  of	  
the	  body	  and	  the	  frequency	  with	  which	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  exercises	  the	  power.	  	  …	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  Hong	  
Kong	  experience	  so	  far,	  there	  is	  little	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  these	  values	  [of	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law]	  are	  at	  risk.	  …	  For	  the	  
future	  much	  may	  depend	  upon	  the	  frequency,	  the	  subject	  matter	  and	  content	  of	  Standing	  Committee	  
interpretations	  and	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  they	  are	  sought.’	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July 
2008 
PRC Vice-President Xi Jinping (as he then was) 
spoke in Hong Kong on the desirability of 
‘mutual understanding and support’ and 
‘cooperation and coordination’ among the 
Executive, Legislature and Judiciary 
Hong Kong Bar Association (HKBA) 
issued statement on judicial 
independence 
Nov 
2009 
HK and Macau Affairs Office Deputy Director 
Zhang Xiaoming (as he then was) spoke in 
Macau of the desirability of coordination 
among the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary 
in the SARs of Macau and HK 
HKBA issued another statement on 
judicial independence  
Oct 
2012 
NPCSC Hong Kong Basic Law Committee 
Vice-Director Elsie Leung (formerly Secretary 
for Justice, HKSAR Government) commented 
that Hong Kong judges lacked sufficient 
understanding of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ 
and the relationship between the Central 
Authorities and the HKSAR 
HKBA issued statement in response to 
Elsie Leung’s remarks 
 
Nov 
2012 
Tsinghua University law professor Cheng Jie, 
speaking at a seminar in Hong Kong, 
questioned the existing practice of appointing 
foreign citizens (in addition to locals) to be 
Hong Kong judges 
HKBA issued statement on the 
judiciary of the HKSAR defending the 
existing practice of judicial 
appointments  
June 
2014 
PRC State Council Information Office 
published White Paper on One Country Two 
Systems45 which, inter alia, suggests that 
members of the HKSAR’s Executive, 
Legislature and Judiciary should all be 
‘patriots’ 
HKBA issued statement in response to 
the White Paper. Dennis Kwok, 
Legislative Councillor elected from the 
functional constituency of lawyers, 
organised a ‘silent march’ in protest; 
more than 1000 member of the legal 
community joined the march 
Sept 
2015 
Zhang Xiaoming, Director of the Liaison Office 
of the Central Government in the HKSAR, at a 
seminar to commemorate the 25th anniversary 
of the promulgation of the Basic Law, spoke 
about the constitutional status of the Chief 
Executive of the HKSAR, suggesting that his 
status is above the Executive, Legislature and 
Judiciary 
HKBA issued statement in response to 
the speech46  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  The	  Practice	  of	  the	  ‘One	  Country,	  Two	  Systems’	  Policy	  in	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  Special	  Administrative	  Region,	  
<http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474982986578.htm>	  accessed	  21	  Feb	  2016.	  
46	  The	  HKBA’s	  statements	  mentioned	  in	  this	  table	  are	  all	  available	  at	  <http://hkba.org/whatsnew/press-­‐
release/index.html>	  accessed	  27	  Feb	  2016).	  For	  the	  latest	  statement	  on	  judicial	  independence	  and	  public	  criticisms	  
of	  judicial	  decisions,	  see	  ‘Statement	  of	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  Bar	  Association	  in	  Response	  to	  Certain	  Recent	  Statements	  
made	  in	  relation	  to	  Judicial	  Decisions’,	  published	  on	  this	  website	  on	  25	  Feb	  2016.	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Appointment and conditions of service of judges47 
Judges and judicial officers in Hong Kong must be professionally qualified lawyers. 
Generally, in order to be eligible for appointment, a person must be qualified to practise as a 
barrister or solicitor48 and has, since becoming so qualified, been in private practice or been a 
lawyer employed by the Government for at least a specified period of time, which is at least 10 
years in the case of a judge of the High Court49 and at least 5 years in the case of District Judge 
and other judicial officers.50 The high offices of Chief Justice and permanent judges of the Court 
of Final Appeal are in practice appointed from judges of the High Court, particularly its Court of 
Appeal, although barristers who have practised as a barrister or solicitor in Hong Kong for a 
period of at least 10 years are also eligible.51  
Article 88 of the Basic Law of the HKSAR provides that judges of the HKSAR shall be 
appointed by the Chief Executive of the HKSAR on the recommendation of an independent 
commission composed of local judges, persons from the legal profession and eminent persons 
from other sectors. Article 92 of the Basic Law provides that judges shall be chosen on the basis 
of their judicial and professional qualities and may be recruited from other common law 
jurisdictions. Further, appointments of the Chief Justice, other judges of the Court of Final 
Appeal and the Chief Judge of the High Court require the endorsement of the Legislative 
Council52 and reporting of the appointment to the NPCSC for the record, pursuant to Article 90 
of the Basic Law.  
 These constitutional guarantees are implemented by the establishment of the Judicial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  This	  section	  draws	  on	  the	  previous	  work	  of	  one	  of	  the	  co-­‐authors,	  P	  Y	  Lo	  (n	  2	  above).	  
48	  Hong	  Kong’s	  legal	  profession	  is	  a	  divided	  profession	  consisting	  of	  barristers	  and	  solicitors	  in	  the	  English	  tradition.	  
Barristers	  are	  advocates	  specialising	  in	  litigation;	  they	  have	  general	  rights	  of	  audience	  before	  all	  Hong	  Kong	  courts.	  
Solicitors	  are	  lawyers	  qualified	  to	  provide	  legal	  advice	  and	  legal	  services	  to	  clients,	  including	  representation	  of	  
clients	  in	  litigation,	  but	  their	  rights	  of	  audience	  before	  the	  courts	  are	  limited	  to	  the	  District	  Court,	  the	  magistrates’	  
courts	  and	  selected	  proceedings	  before	  the	  High	  Court	  (though	  legislative	  amendments	  were	  enacted	  in	  2010	  to	  
enable	  them	  to	  undertake	  advocacy	  work	  in	  the	  High	  Court	  and	  the	  CFA	  after	  passing	  an	  assessment).	  	  Barristers	  
are	  members	  of	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  Bar	  Association.	  Solicitors	  are	  members	  of	  the	  Law	  Society	  of	  Hong	  Kong.	  The	  Bar	  
Association	  and	  the	  Law	  Society	  together	  constitute	  the	  mainstream	  voice	  of	  the	  legal	  profession.	  
49	  See	  the	  High	  Court	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  4)	  s	  9(1).	  The	  period	  of	  at	  least	  10	  years	  may	  include	  a	  period	  of	  time	  of	  
service	  as	  a	  District	  Judge	  or	  other	  judicial	  officer.	  
50	  See	  the	  District	  Court	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  336)	  s	  5;	  the	  Magistrates	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  227)	  ss	  5AA,	  5AB;	  the	  Coroners	  
Ordinance	  (Cap	  504)	  s	  3AA;	  the	  Labour	  Tribunal	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  25)	  s	  4A;	  and	  the	  Small	  Claims	  Tribunal	  Ordinance	  
(Cap	  338)	  s	  4AA.	  
51	  See	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  484)	  s	  12(1),	  (1A).	  For	  NPJs,	  see	  s	  12(3),	  (4),	  and	  the	  
above	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  judicial	  system.	  	  
52	  See	  the	  section	  below	  on	  ‘The	  Legislative	  Council	  and	  the	  judiciary’.	  	  
12	  
	  
Officers Recommendation Commission (JORC).53 The JORC consists of the Chief Justice (who 
shall be the Chairman), the Secretary for Justice54, 7 members appointed by the Chief Executive 
(CE), including 2 judges, 1 barrister, 1 solicitor, and 3 lay persons. The CE is obliged to consult 
the Hong Kong Bar Association and the Law Society of Hong Kong – the professional bodies of 
barristers and solicitors in Hong Kong respectively -- on the appointment of a barrister and a 
solicitor to the JORC, but he is not obliged to appoint the persons recommended by these 
professional bodies.55 In practice so far, the CE has always accepted such recommendations. He 
has also accepted all the recommendations of the JORC on matters of appointment, extension of 
appointment and renewal of contracts of judges and judicial officers.56  
Given the voting rules of the JORC requiring a dominant majority of the members 
present for a resolution to be effective,57 Government appointees consisting of the Secretary for 
Justice and the 3 lay persons may not dominate the decision-making. On the other hand, as the 
JORC cannot pass any resolution if there are more than two dissenting votes, these Government 
appointees have the power to veto any appointment favoured by a majority of JORC members. In 
practice, the JORC seems to have worked well. Permanent Judge Patrick Chan said on the 
occasion of his retirement from the CFA in 2013 as follows: 
‘There is one thing I have wanted to say for a long time to those who still perceive any doubt 
about the independence of our Judiciary. Since 1995, I have been involved in the selection of 
judges, either as a member of the Judicial Service Commission or the Judicial Officers 
Recommendation Commission or the Judiciary’s internal selection committee. I can bear 
witness to the fact that there has never been any interference from any quarter or any person in 
the appointment of judges. All my colleagues were appointed on their own merits.’ 58	  
It should be noted in this regard that not all matters of judicial appointment and extension of 
appointments are within the purview of the JORC. In particular, the following matters are outside 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  	  Judicial	  Officers	  Recommendation	  Commission	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  92).	  The	  predecessor	  of	  the	  JORC	  was	  the	  
Judicial	  Service	  Commission	  established	  in	  1976.	  For	  the	  annual	  reports	  of	  the	  JORC,	  see	  
<http://www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/publications/publications.htm>.	  
54	  The	  nature	  and	  functions	  of	  the	  office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  for	  Justice	  (SJ)	  are	  largely	  identical	  to	  those	  of	  the	  
Attorney-­‐General	  in	  colonial	  Hong	  Kong.	  The	  SJ	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  senior	  principal	  officials	  of	  the	  HKSAR	  
Government,	  the	  head	  of	  its	  Department	  of	  Justice,	  the	  chief	  legal	  advisor	  to	  the	  Government,	  and	  the	  top	  
decision-­‐maker	  in	  matters	  of	  criminal	  prosecution.	  Both	  in	  colonial	  times	  and	  after	  the	  HKSAR	  was	  established,	  
concerns	  had	  occasionally	  been	  expressed	  regarding	  whether	  it	  was	  appropriate	  for	  the	  Attorney-­‐General	  or	  the	  SJ	  
to	  be	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Service	  Commission	  or	  JORC,	  as	  this	  could	  be	  a	  source	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  
executive	  branch	  of	  government	  on	  judicial	  appointments.	  See,	  eg,	  Legislative	  Council	  Administration	  of	  Justice	  
and	  Legal	  Services	  Panel	  report	  (2010/11),	  paras	  32-­‐35	  <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-­‐
11/english/panels/ajls/reports/aj0713cb2-­‐2328-­‐e.pdf>	  accessed	  27	  Feb	  2016.	  For	  the	  Government’s	  views	  (Feb	  
2011,	  see	  <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-­‐11/english/panels/ajls/papers/aj0228cb2-­‐1129-­‐2-­‐e.pdf>	  
55	  	  Judicial	  Officers	  Recommendation	  Commission	  Ordinance	  (JORC	  Ordinance),	  s	  3(1)(1A),	  (1B).	  	  
56	  For	  a	  list	  of	  judicial	  offices	  filled	  by	  the	  CE	  upon	  the	  recommendation	  of	  the	  JORC,	  see	  Schedule	  1	  of	  the	  JORC	  
Ordinance.	  	  
57	  	  JORC	  Ordinance,	  s	  3(3A).	  	  
58	  Farewell	  Sitting	  for	  the	  Honourable	  Mr	  Justice	  Chan	  PJ	  (18	  October	  2013)	  (2013)	  16	  HKCFAR	  1012	  at	  1019.	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its jurisdiction but within the scope of the power and responsibility of the Chief Justice (CJ): (1) 
The appointment of deputy judges of the High Court and the District Court and of deputy 
magistrates, and the termination of their appointment: These matters are within the exclusive 
power of the CJ.59 (2) The extension beyond retirement age (which is 65) of the appointment of 
any Permanent Judge of the CFA: The CE, acting in accordance with the CJ’s recommendation, 
may grant such an extension for not more than two periods each of three years.60 (3) The 
appointment of a qualified person above the age of 65 as a Permanent Judge of the CFA for a 
three-year term, and its extension for not more than one three-year term: The CE, acting in 
accordance with the CJ’s recommendation, may make such an appointment or grant such 
extension.61 (4) The renewal of the appointment of any NPJ of the CFA: NPJs (whether from 
Hong Kong or from overseas) are appointed for a three-year term and are not subject to any 
retirement age. The CE, acting in accordance with the CJ’s recommendation, may renew the 
appointment of any NPJ.62 Each renewal is for a three-year term, and there is no limit on the 
number of renewals. 
 
Recruitment of judges  
Vacancies of judicial positions at all levels of Hong Kong courts, except the CA and the 
CFA, are openly advertised during recruitment exercises.63 Sometimes the Judiciary would be 
proactive in encouraging particular individuals to apply. Applicants are required to disclose 
details of their professional practice or employment and the income received therefrom. Those 
who have held temporary judicial appointments or other judicial experience are also asked to 
enclose items of their judicial work. Applications are shortlisted by selection panels consisting of 
judges and judicial officers relevant to the level of court concerned. The shortlisted candidates 
are then interviewed by the selection panel, which will then forward its selections to the JORC.64 
Given the significant difference between the high income of successful senior lawyers in 
Hong Kong and the salary levels of judges, it has not been easy to recruit High Court judges,65 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  See	  n	  34	  above.	  
60	  Hong	  Kong	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  Ordinance,	  s	  14(2)(a).	  In	  practice,	  some	  Permanent	  Judges	  have	  been	  granted	  
such	  extension.	  Permanent	  Judge	  Bokhary	  and	  Permanent	  Judge	  Chan	  retired	  in	  2012	  and	  2013	  respectively	  upon	  
reaching	  the	  retirement	  age	  of	  65.	  
61	  Ibid,	  s	  14(2)(b).	  
62	  Ibid,	  s	  14(4).	  
63	  Young	  et	  al,	  ‘Role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice’	  (n	  22	  above)	  234-­‐5.	  
64	  Ibid,	  235.	  The	  selection	  panels	  may	  include	  some	  members	  of	  the	  JORC,	  particularly	  those	  members	  who	  are	  
judges	  (ibid).	  	  
65	  See,	  eg,	  the	  LegCo	  paper	  on	  judicial	  manpower	  <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-­‐
15/english/panels/ajls/papers/ajls20150518cb4-­‐964-­‐3-­‐e.pdf>	  accessed	  27	  Feb	  2016.	  Chief	  Justice	  Ma	  stated	  at	  the	  
Opening	  of	  the	  Legal	  Year	  on	  12	  Jan	  2015	  that	  ‘it	  is	  better	  to	  leave	  positions	  vacant	  than	  to	  have	  appointments	  of	  
persons	  not	  of	  the	  required	  standard’:	  <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201501/12/P201501120481.htm>	  
accessed	  27	  Feb	  2016.	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who are usually recruited from Senior Counsel,66 apart from by promotion from the District 
Court.  
 
Training of judges 
As in other common law jurisdictions, Hong Kong judges and judicial officers are not 
trained to be such from fresh law graduates who passed an entrance examination for intending 
judges. Unlike the case in some civil law jurisdictions, there is in Hong Kong no training college 
for newly recruited judges or judicial officers. Rather, the Hong Kong Judicial Institute (formerly 
the Judicial Studies Board)67 under the Judiciary organises occasional lectures, conferences, and 
workshops for judges and judicial officers on skills requisite for effective judging, including, for 
example, judgment writing in Chinese and mediation.  
 
Appraisal of judges 
The principle of judicial independence needs to be accompanied by judicial 
accountability, otherwise there is the risk of abuse of judicial power. In Hong Kong, the ‘court 
leaders’ of courts at various levels (i.e. the CJ, the Chief Judge of the High Court, the Chief 
District Judge and the Chief Magistrate) are responsible for monitoring the performance of 
judges or magistrates serving in their respective courts.68 Annual appraisal reports are compiled 
by the relevant court leaders for individual judges and magistrates. After considering an appeal 
from the decision of a particular judge or magistrate, the relevant judge in the superior court may, 
if it is considered necessary, fill in a form of assessment of the decision concerned. 69 
 
Code of conduct for judges 
 In 2004, the Hong Kong Judiciary produced and published a Guide to Judicial Conduct, 
providing norms of behaviour for judges and judicial officers in work and in other relevant 
contexts.70 The code of conduct was drafted after taking into account similar codes in common 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  Senior	  Counsel	  is	  a	  title	  conferred	  upon	  the	  most	  reputable	  senior	  members	  of	  the	  Bar	  by	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  
consultation	  with	  the	  Bar	  Council	  and	  the	  Law	  Society	  under	  s	  31A	  of	  the	  Legal	  Practitioners	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  159).	  
It	  is	  the	  equivalent	  of	  Queen’s	  Counsel	  in	  colonial	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  in	  the	  UK.	  It	  has	  been	  pointed	  out	  that	  ‘no	  
solicitor	  has	  ever	  been	  appointed	  directly	  to	  the	  High	  Court	  (apart	  from	  those	  promoted	  from	  the	  lower	  courts)’:	  
Johannes	  Chan,	  ‘The	  Judiciary’	  in	  Johannes	  Chan	  and	  C.L.	  Lim	  (eds),	  Law	  of	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  Constitution	  (2nd	  edn,	  
Sweet	  &	  Maxwell	  2015)	  361	  at	  383.	  
67	  The	  Hong	  Kong	  Judicial	  Institute	  was	  established	  in	  early	  2013.	  Its	  predecessor,	  the	  Judicial	  Studies	  Board,	  was	  
established	  in	  1988.	  
68	  Peter	  Wesley-­‐Smith,	  ‘Individual	  and	  Institutional	  Independence	  of	  the	  Judiciary’	  in	  Steve	  Tsang	  (ed),	  Judicial	  
Independence	  and	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  (Hong	  Kong	  University	  Press	  2011)	  99	  at	  121.	  
69	  Young	  et	  al,	  ‘Role	  of	  the	  Chief	  Justice’	  (n	  22	  above)	  236.	  
70	  <http://www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/publications/gjc_e.pdf>	  accessed	  28	  Feb	  2016.	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law jurisdictions such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada.71 One of the subjects covered by 
the Guide is the limit on judges’ participation in political organisations and activities. 72 
Subsequently, there was some public concern about the participation in political parties of ‘part-
time’ judges who are also practising lawyers.73 In response, the Judiciary introduced a set of 
guidelines for part-time judges which limit their participation in political parties.74 
 To avoid potential conflict of interests, judges appointed as regular judges (with security 
of tenure until retirement) in the High Court and District Court are required to undertake75 not to 
practise as a barrister or solicitor after retiring from or leaving judicial office, except with the 
consent of the Chief Executive.76 Judges of the CFA are expressly prohibited by statute from 
returning to private legal practice after retirement from the court.77  
 
Complaints against judges  
 The Hong Kong Judiciary has published a leaflet78 describing how members of the public 
may lodge complaints relating to the Judiciary and how such complaints would be handled. 
Basically, no complaints against judicial decisions will be entertained, as the proper channel is 
appeal to a higher court. Complaints against the conduct of individual judges may be lodged, and 
will be dealt with by the relevant court leader (the Chief Justice, the Chief Judge of the High 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  In	  October	  2004	  –	  the	  same	  month	  as	  the	  publication	  of	  Hong	  Kong’s	  Guide	  to	  Judicial	  Conduct	  -­‐-­‐	  a	  Guide	  to	  
Judicial	  Conduct	  for	  the	  English	  Judiciary	  was	  also	  published	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  See	  
<https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-­‐content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Guidance/judicial_conduct_2013.pdf>	  
accessed	  17	  Feb	  2016).	  This	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  publication	  in	  2009	  of	  the	  UK	  Supreme	  Court’s	  Guide	  to	  Judicial	  
Conduct.	  
72	  See	  paras	  75-­‐77	  of	  the	  Guide.	  For	  example,	  ‘Judges	  should	  refrain	  from	  membership	  in	  or	  association	  with	  
political	  organizations	  or	  activities’	  (para	  76).	  	  
73	  See	  the	  section	  below	  on	  temporary,	  part-­‐time	  and	  ‘non-­‐regular’	  judges.	  	  
74	  ‘Guideline	  in	  relation	  to	  part-­‐time	  Judges	  and	  participation	  in	  political	  activities’	  (first	  published	  in	  2006)	  
<http://www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/crt_services/pphlt/pdf/guideline_part_time_judge.pdf	  >	  accessed	  28	  Feb	  2016.	  
The	  following	  provisions	  are	  noteworthy.	  ‘Part-­‐time	  Judges	  sit	  only	  limited	  periods	  and	  are	  in	  full-­‐time	  practice	  in	  
the	  legal	  profession.’	  A	  part-­‐time	  judge	  may	  be	  a	  member	  of	  a	  political	  party	  but	  ‘active	  participation	  in	  the	  
activities	  of	  a	  political	  party’	  is	  considered	  unacceptable.	  The	  guidelines	  provide	  examples	  of	  such	  ‘active	  
participation’.	  It	  is	  also	  stated	  that	  ‘[j]udicial	  review	  cases	  are	  not	  listed	  before	  part-­‐time	  Judges’.	  	  	  
75	  See	  Hong	  Kong	  Judiciary	  (n	  28	  above)	  36;	  Albert	  H	  Y	  Chen,	  ‘The	  Determination	  and	  Revision	  of	  Judicial	  
Remuneration:	  Report	  of	  a	  Consultancy	  Study’	  (Sept	  2004),	  in	  Standing	  Committee	  on	  Judicial	  Salaries	  and	  
Conditions	  of	  Service,	  Report	  on	  the	  Study	  on	  the	  Appropriate	  Institutional	  Structure,	  Mechanism	  and	  Methodology	  
for	  the	  Determination	  of	  Judicial	  Remuneration	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  (Nov	  2005)	  
<http://www.jsscs.gov.hk/reports/en/jscs_08/index.htm>	  accessed	  28	  Feb	  2016,	  Annex	  E,	  para	  8.17.	  
76	  There	  has	  been	  no	  known	  case	  of	  such	  consent	  having	  been	  sought:	  Chan	  (n	  66	  above)	  383.	  
77	  Hong	  Kong	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  Ordinance,	  s	  13.	  
78	  Complaints	  Against	  a	  Judge’s	  Conduct	  (Nov	  2010)	  
<http://www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/crt_services/pphlt/pdf/complaintsjjoleaflet.pdf>	  accessed	  28	  Feb	  2016.	  For	  the	  
Judiciary’s	  paper	  dated	  March	  2016	  on	  the	  review	  of	  the	  mechanism	  for	  handling	  complaints	  against	  judicial	  
conduct	  and	  improvement	  measures	  that	  would	  take	  effect	  as	  from	  April	  2016,	  see	  
<http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-­‐16/english/panels/ajls/papers/ajls20160321cb4-­‐717-­‐3-­‐e.pdf>	  assessed	  22	  Mar	  
2016.	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Court, the Chief District Judge and the Chief Magistrate). The court leader may investigate the 
matter and reply to the complainant. If necessary, the matter may be brought to the attention of 
the CJ or JORC. Where appropriate, advice would be given to the judge or judicial officer 
concerned. 
 In the budget for the Judiciary submitted to the Legislative Council in 2015, it was 
proposed to establish a new secretariat to provide administrative support to the CJ and court 
leaders in handling complaints.79 In the year 2014, there were 40 complaints against judicial 
conduct, in addition to 160 complaints relating to the administration of the Judiciary. The 
relevant numbers in 2015 were 14 and 143 respectively.80  
 
Tenure of judges 
 Article 89 of the Basic Law secures the tenure of ‘judges’81 of the HKSAR courts by 
providing that they may only be removed by the CE on the ground of inability to discharge their 
duties or for misbehaviour, on the recommendation of a tribunal appointed by the CJ and 
consisting of no fewer than 3 local judges.82  
 Judges of the CFA and the Chief Judge of the High Court may only be removed by the 
CE following the recommendation of the tribunal and the Legislative Council’s endorsement of 
the proposed removal; also, the removal must be reported to the NPCSC for the record.83 In the 
case of the CJ, the investigation into the cause for removal would be carried out by a tribunal 
appointed by the CE and consisting of no fewer than 5 local judges.84	  	  
The security of tenure or procedural protection against removal afforded by Article 89 of 
the Basic Law is similar to the arrangement in colonial Hong Kong under the Letters Patent 
1917-1991, Article XVIA, which was applicable to the judges of the Supreme Court (equivalent 
to the High Court in the post-1997 era) and the District Court. In Hong Kong’s colonial history, 
apart from the temporary suspension of the Chief Justice by the Governor in 1846, and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  ‘The	  Judiciary	  Administrator’s	  Speaking	  Notes	  at	  the	  Special	  Finance	  Committee	  Meeting	  on	  27	  March	  2015’	  
<http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-­‐15/english/fc/fc/sp_note/session2-­‐ja-­‐e.pdf>	  accessed	  28	  Feb	  2016,	  para	  9.	  
80	  See	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  Judiciary	  Annual	  Reports	  <http://www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/publications/publications.htm>.	  
81	  There	  is	  no	  definition	  of	  ‘judges’	  in	  the	  Basic	  Law.	  Art	  91	  of	  the	  Basic	  Law	  refers	  to	  ‘members	  of	  the	  judiciary	  
other	  than	  judges’.	  Arts	  92	  and	  93	  refer	  to	  ‘judges	  and	  other	  members	  of	  the	  judiciary’.	  ‘Judges’	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
art	  89	  should	  include	  judges	  of	  the	  CFA,	  High	  Court	  and	  District	  Court	  (whose	  appointments	  last	  until	  they	  reach	  
the	  retirement	  age	  specified	  in	  the	  relevant	  law),	  and	  probably	  does	  not	  include	  magistrates	  and	  other	  judicial	  
officers	  below	  the	  rank	  of	  District	  Court	  judges,	  as	  they	  did	  not	  enjoy	  security	  of	  tenure	  in	  the	  colonial	  legal	  system,	  
and	  the	  Basic	  Law	  ‘maintain[s]	  the	  existing	  system	  of	  appointment	  and	  removal	  of	  members	  of	  the	  judiciary	  other	  
than	  judges’	  (art	  91).	  
82	  This	  mechanism	  for	  removal	  to	  some	  extent	  follows	  the	  previous	  arrangement	  under	  the	  Letters	  Patent	  1917-­‐
1991,	  Art	  XVIA,	  which	  was	  applicable	  to	  the	  judges	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  (equivalent	  to	  the	  High	  Court	  in	  the	  post-­‐
1997	  era)	  and	  the	  District	  Court.	  	  	  
83	  	  Basic	  Law,	  Art	  90.	  
84	  	  Ibid,	  Art	  89.	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removal of a Chief Justice by the London government in 1912, there were no cases of removal of 
judges in accordance with the formal legal procedure for investigation and removal. However, it 
is believed that in the 1980s, three (expatriate) judges were pressured to resign because of 
misbehaviour.85  
 The Basic Law maintains in Article 91 the previous system of removal of ‘members of 
the judiciary other than judges’,86 which is provided for in the Judicial Officers (Tenure of Office) 
Ordinance. 87  The Ordinance provides for the establishment of a tribunal of investigation 
consisting of two High Court judges and one public officer, which would report its findings to 
the JORC; the latter would consider the report and make a recommendation to the CE on the 
matter. The procedure in this Ordinance is applicable to those magistrates and judicial officers of 
similar rank who continue to be employed after completing their first three-year contracts.88 In 
practice, newly employed magistrates and judicial officer are granted a three-year contract, after 
which they may seek renewal of the contract or apply to transfer to ‘permanent and pensionable 
terms’.89 
 Security of tenure for judges lasts until retirement, and it may be relevant here to mention 
the procedure for extension of judicial office beyond retirement age, which, like security of 
tenure, may be relevant to judicial independence. The possible extension beyond retirement age 
of the appointment of a Permanent Judge of the CFA by the CE upon the recommendation of the 
CJ has been mentioned above. 90 In the case of the CJ himself, the CE may, upon the 
recommendation of the JORC, extend the appointment of the CJ for not more than two periods 
each of three years. 91 As regards High Court judges who reach retirement age, their appointment 
may also be extended by the CE in accordance with the recommendation of the JORC for a 
specified period or periods not exceeding five years in the aggregate.92 As discussed below, 
judges who have retired may still have the opportunity to serve as deputy judges for limited 
periods if so appointed by the CJ. 
 
Temporary, part-time or ‘non-regular’ judges 
 The Hong Kong judiciary is to a considerable extent staffed at various levels of the court 
system by recorders (of the High Court), deputy High Court judges, deputy District Judges and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  Gittings	  (n	  23	  above)	  165;	  Chan	  (n	  39	  above)	  386.	  
86	  See	  note	  81	  above.	  	  
87	  Cap	  433,	  Laws	  of	  Hong	  Kong.	  	  
88	  Ibid,	  s	  10.	  
89	  Wesley-­‐Smith	  (n	  68	  above)	  109.	  
90	  See	  n	  60	  above.	  	  
91	  Hong	  Kong	  Court	  of	  Final	  Appeal	  Ordinance,	  s	  14(2)(a).	  
92	  High	  Court	  Ordinance,	  s	  11A.	  A	  similar	  provision	  applies	  to	  District	  Judges	  appointed	  before	  1	  Jan	  1987,	  whose	  
statutory	  retirement	  age	  is	  60.	  District	  Judges	  appointed	  after	  this	  date	  retire	  at	  the	  age	  of	  65,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  
provision	  for	  extension	  beyond	  retirement	  age.	  The	  statutory	  retirement	  age	  for	  High	  Court	  and	  CFA	  judges	  is	  also	  
65.	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deputy magistrates.93  A scholar has used the term ‘non-regular judges’ to refer to these 
temporary or part-time judges.94 Recorders are usually Senior Counsel appointed for a three-year 
term, during which they serve as a judge of the CFI for a continuous period of several weeks per 
year. They are appointed by the CE upon the recommendation of the JORC.95 Other ‘non-regular’ 
judges include (1) retired judges (such as judges who have retired from the High Court, and are 
subsequently appointed to serve as deputy judges in the same court for a fixed period), (2) ‘part-
time’ judges, who are practising lawyers appointed to serve as deputy judges or deputy 
magistrates for a fixed period of, for instance, several months, and (3) ‘temporary’ or ‘acting’ 
judges of a court seconded from the court below to serve as deputy judges in the higher court for 
a fixed period. As mentioned above,96 the Chief Justice alone (without the need to refer the 
matter to the JORC or the CE) may appoint and terminate the appointment of all these ‘non-
regular’ judges (other than recorders) and magistrates, decide on the length of the period of 
appointment, and renew the appointment from time to time.  
 There are various pragmatic considerations that arguably justify the practice of having 
‘non-regular judges’, despite the possible conflict between this practice and the theory of judicial 
independence as mentioned below. The difficulty of recruiting suitable candidates to the High 
Court bench as mentioned above might justify the appointment of some retired High Court 
judges as deputy High Court judges,97 as well as the appointment of senior members of the Bar 
as ‘part-time’ judges. The experience of serving as deputy judges or recorders might encourage 
some of these Senior Counsel to apply to become full-time ‘regular’ High Court judges. 
Similarly, lawyers who serve as deputy magistrates might decide to apply to become full-time 
magistrates. From the perspective of the Judiciary, appointments to ‘non-regular’ judicial 
positions enable potential candidates for the Judiciary to be ‘tried out’.98 This consideration is 
not only applicable to practising lawyers appointed to serve as recorders, deputy judges or 
deputy magistrates, but equally applicable to judges from lower courts appointed to ‘act up’ in a 
higher court.  
 As of the end of 2014, the numbers of deputy judges sitting in the CFI and District Court 
respectively were 13 and 6, while the numbers of judges (excluding deputy judges) sitting in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  See	  generally	  Wesley-­‐Smith	  (n	  68	  above);	  Berry	  F	  C	  Hsu,	  ‘Judicial	  Independence	  Under	  the	  Basic	  Law’	  (2004)	  34	  
HKLJ	  279;	  Zhang	  Shudian,	  ‘Empirical	  Observations	  on	  the	  Operation	  of	  the	  System	  of	  Recorders	  and	  Deputy	  Judges	  
in	  the	  HKSAR’	  [2015]	  4	  Gangao	  yanjiu	  (Hong	  Kong	  and	  Macau	  Studies)	  3	  -­‐14	  (in	  Chinese).	  
94	  Wesley-­‐Smith	  (n	  68	  above)	  101.	  
95	  See	  note	  32	  above.	  
96	  See	  note	  34	  above	  and	  the	  accompanying	  text.	  	  
97	  In	  this	  regard	  appointment	  as	  deputy	  judges	  for	  a	  period	  (of	  say	  several	  months)	  which	  may	  be	  renewed	  may	  be	  
a	  more	  flexible	  human	  resources	  management	  tool	  than	  formal	  extension	  beyond	  retirement	  age.	  	  
98	  However,	  some	  statements	  of	  international	  standards	  of	  judicial	  independence	  discourage	  such	  ‘probationary’	  
arrangements	  for	  judges:	  International	  Bar	  Association	  Minimum	  Standards	  of	  Judicial	  Independence	  (adopted	  in	  
1982),	  art	  23;	  Universal	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Independence	  of	  Justice	  (‘Montreal	  Declaration’)	  (1983)	  
<http://www.jiwp.org/#!montreal-­‐declaration/c1bue>	  accessed	  28	  Feb	  2016,	  art	  2.20.	  Both	  documents	  are	  
referred	  to	  in	  Hsu	  (n	  93	  above)	  296.	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CFI and District Court were 24 and 20 respectively.99 Our study of the ‘daily cause lists’ for 
eleven days in September and October 2015100 reveals that the average numbers of ‘regular’ 
judges and deputy judges sitting in court every day were 11.7 and 9 respectively for the CFI of 
the High Court, and 11.1 and 7.2 respectively for the District Court (excluding the family court). 
According to data supplied to the Legislative Council in 2015,101 there were as of April 2015, 13 
deputy judges in the High Court, including 10 appointed from within the Judiciary and 3 
appointed from outside (i.e. from the legal profession). In the period 2011-2015, the numbers of 
deputy judges and magistrates appointed from outside were as follows:102  
 
Appointments 
from outside 
the Judiciary 
1 March 
2011 
1 March 2012 1 March 2013 1 March 2014 1 March 2015 
Deputy Judge 
of the CFI 
 2 4 7 5 2 
Deputy 
District Judge 
1 1 1 0 0 
Deputy 
Magistrate 
16 25 10 24 12 
Deputy 
Special 
Magistrate103  
8 8 5 9 5 
Total 27 38 23 38 19 
 
 The following data relating to recorders and deputy judges of the High Court and deputy 
District Judges was published in 2015, and was based on a study of the HKSAR Government 
Gazettes in 2000-2014 and other sources.104  
No. of recorders in office during a particular year The number was in the range of 8-16. 
No. of deputy High Court judges in office during 
a particular year 
The number was in the range of 15-35. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  See	  the	  LegCo	  document	  <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-­‐16/english/panels/ajls/papers/ajls20151015cb4-­‐386-­‐
1-­‐e.pdf>	  accessed	  28	  Feb	  2016.	  	  
100	  The	  dates	  concerned	  were	  17,	  18,	  21-­‐25	  and	  29	  Sept	  2015	  and	  2,	  5	  and	  6	  Oct	  2015.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  data	  on	  
deputy	  judges	  set	  out	  in	  the	  text	  above,	  it	  may	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  numbers	  of	  recorders	  sitting	  in	  the	  CFI	  on	  
these	  11	  days	  were	  2	  on	  one	  day,	  1	  on	  6	  days,	  and	  zero	  on	  4	  days.	  	  
101	  <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-­‐15/english/fc/fc/sup_w/s-­‐ja-­‐e.pdf>	  accessed	  28	  Feb	  2016.	  
102	  <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-­‐15/english/fc/fc/w_q/ja-­‐e.pdf>	  accessed	  28	  Feb	  2016.	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  For	  special	  magistrates,	  see	  n	  33	  above.	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  Zhang	  (n	  93	  above)	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No. of deputy District Judges in office during a 
particular year  
The number was in the range of 17-43.  
 
Other figures revealed by the same study include the following. In 1997-2014, a total of 
29 Senior Counsel from the legal profession were appointed recorders at various points in time. 
Nine among these 29 persons were subsequently appointed (full-time regular) judges of the 
CFI.105 In 2000-2013, there were a total of 86 appointments to deputy judgeship in the CFI.106 
Among them, 35 were District Judges, and 33 were Senior Counsel from the legal profession.107 
Their appointments as deputy CFI judges of 12 District Judges were terminated upon their 
appointment as (full-time regular) judges of the CFI.108  There were 25 deputy judges in office in 
the CFI during 2013. Among them, 7 were from the Bar, 7 were District Judges and 11 were 
retired judges.109 In 2000-2013, there were a total of 145 appointments to deputy judgeship in the 
District Court. The appointments of 17 deputy District Judges were terminated upon their 
appointment as (full-time regular) District Judges.110 The study also revealed that most High 
Court judges had served as deputy judges of the CFI or recorders before they were appointed as 
High Court judges, and most District Judges had served as deputy District Judges or deputy 
judges of the CFI.111  
The existing system of ‘non-regular judges’ in Hong Kong has been criticised by local 
academics as involving a potential breach of the Basic Law and of international standards 
regarding safeguards for judicial independence.112 Justice William Waung, a retired judge of 
Hong Kong’s High Court, wrote forcefully in 2015 as follows:  
‘The system of regular deployment of large number of temporary judges … is a serious 
erosion of the principle of judicial independence, as temporary judges are serving, without 
independent appointment, without permanent tenure and without security and they serve at the 
pleasure of … the Chief Justice … In some ways, it can be said that all the judicial 
independence safeguard put in place for the regularly appointed Judges is undermined by the 
practice of using on a regular basis large number of temporary judges.’113 
 
Judicial remuneration 
 Like security of tenure, financial security is also an important institutional guarantee of 
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  Ibid,	  6.	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  Ibid,	  6.	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  Ibid,	  10.	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  Ibid,	  6.	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  Ibid,	  10.	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  Ibid,	  6-­‐7.	  
111	  Ibid,	  7.	  
112	  Hsu	  (n	  93	  above);	  Wesley-­‐Smith	  (n	  68	  above).	  	  
113	  Waung	  (n	  26	  above).	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judicial independence.114 In Hong Kong, the Standing Committee on Judicial Salaries and 
Conditions of Service (SCJS), first established in 1987, advises the Government on the 
determination of judicial salaries and related matters. The Basic Law provides protection against 
reduction of salaries of civil servants and judges below the relevant levels at the time of the 
establishment of the HKSAR in 1997.115 To cope with an economic downturn and severe budget 
deficits, the Government introduced legislation in 2002 and 2003 to enact a series of pay cuts for 
civil servants (which did not however reduce their salaries below the 1997 level).116 Although 
these pay cuts were not applicable to the Judiciary, the latter commissioned a consultancy study 
on the system for the determination of judicial remuneration in Hong Kong. The consultancy 
report, authored by Sir Anthony Mason, was published in 2003, recommending, inter alia, that 
legislation should be enacted in Hong Kong prohibiting the reduction of judicial remuneration in 
any circumstance.117 After considering the SCJS’s ‘Report on the Study on the Appropriate 
Institutional Structure, Mechanism and Methodology for the Determination of Judicial 
Remuneration in Hong Kong’,118 the Government decided in 2008119 to introduce an improved 
mechanism for the determination of judicial remuneration that takes into account a basket of 
specified factors and is more transparent in its operation.120 The SCJS was expanded to become 
an independent body of 7 non-official members (i.e. members of the community who are not 
government officials), including one barrister and one solicitor, but no serving or retired judges.  
The Government also decided that it was not necessary to introduce legislation prohibiting 
judicial pay cuts, but noted that any such cut cannot be introduced administratively and may only 
be enacted by legislation.  
 
Judicial administration 
 The administration of the HKSAR courts is the responsibility of the Judiciary itself. The 
CJ, as head of the Judiciary, has overall control of the administration of Hong Kong’s judicial 
system. In this regard he is assisted by the Judiciary Administrator and the respective ‘court 
leaders’ of the High Court, District Court and the magistracy, all of whom are accountable to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  Valente	  v	  The	  Queen	  [1985]	  2	  SCR	  673.	  See	  the	  discussion	  in	  Wesley-­‐Smith	  (n	  68	  above)	  99-­‐101.	  
115	  	  Basic	  Law,	  Arts	  100,	  93.	  
116	  Public	  Officers	  Pay	  Adjustment	  Ordinance	  2002;	  Public	  Officers	  Pay	  Adjustments	  (2004/2005)	  Ordinance	  2003.	  
The	  constitutionality	  of	  these	  laws	  were	  challenged	  but	  upheld	  by	  the	  CFA	  in	  Secretary	  for	  Justice	  v	  Lau	  Kwok	  Fai	  
(2005)	  8	  HKCFAR	  304.	  
117	  Sir	  Anthony	  Mason,	  ‘Consultancy	  Report:	  System	  for	  the	  Determination	  of	  Judicial	  Remuneration’	  (Feb	  2003)	  
<http://www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/publications/consultancy_report_e.pdf>	  accessed	  28	  Feb	  2016.	  	  	  
118	  See	  note	  75	  above.	  	  
119	  Press	  release	  (20	  May	  2008)	  on	  ‘New	  System	  for	  the	  Determination	  of	  Judicial	  Remuneration’	  
<http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200805/20/P200805200183.htm>	  accessed	  28	  Feb	  2016;	  Standing	  
Committee	  on	  Judicial	  Salaries	  and	  Conditions	  of	  Service,	  Report	  on	  Judicial	  Remuneration	  Review	  2009	  
<http://www.jsscs.gov.hk/reports/en/jscs_09.pdf>	  accessed	  28	  Feb	  2016.	  
120	  For	  the	  existing	  salaries	  of	  Hong	  Kong	  judges	  and	  judicial	  officers,	  see	  the	  LegCo	  paper	  
<http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr14-­‐15/english/fc/fc/w_q/ja-­‐e.pdf>	  accessed	  28	  Feb	  2016,	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  Serial	  No	  2173.	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CJ in administrative matters.121 The Judiciary Administrator is the head of the staff of the 
Judiciary Administration, which is responsible for the maintenance of the running of the courts, 
the registries and the court buildings, and provides the following support services: case reporting 
and transcription, interpretation and translation, bailiff services (for execution of judgments and 
service of summonses), operating the resource centre for unrepresented litigants, and library 
services. The Judiciary Administration also handles the Judiciary’s public relations, and ‘is 
responsible for liaising with and communicating on behalf of the Judiciary with the executive 
and legislative branches of Government, court users and the public.’122  
 
The Legislative Council and the Judiciary   
The budget of the Judiciary in Hong Kong forms part of the Government’s budget, which is 
considered annually by the Legislative Council, which controls public finance in Hong Kong 
through its approval of the budget and public expenditure in the annual Appropriation Bill 
proposed by the Government, in accordance with Article 73(2) and (3) of the Basic Law and the 
Public Finance Ordinance.123 The estimated expenditure of the Judiciary forms part of the 
General Revenue Account and is analysed as a Head of Expenditure in the Estimates 
accompanying the budget proposed by the Government.124 The preparation of the Judiciary’s 
budget is coordinated by the Judiciary Administrator, who liaises with the CJ and the ‘court 
leaders’ in drafting the budget, and then proposes it to the Financial Secretary of the 
Government. 125  When the Government’s budget proposal is considered by the Finance 
Committee of the Legislative Council (LegCo), the Judiciary Administrator is the relevant 
‘controlling officer’ who appears before the Committee to explain and defend that part of the 
budget which relates to the Judiciary.126  
 As mentioned above, the appointment of the CJ, other judges of the CFA and the Chief 
Judge of the High Court is subject to LegCo’s endorsement. In handling this matter, LegCo has 
not required the judicial candidates to appear before it to answer questions, as in the case of the 
US Senate Judiciary Committee holding hearings on appointments to the Supreme Court. The 
current procedure, first introduced in 2003,127 is that information on the recommended candidates 
will be supplied to the House Committee of LegCo, which may decide to establish a 
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  Kong	  Judiciary	  (n	  28	  above)	  15,	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  Ibid,	  45.	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  Cap	  2,	  Laws	  of	  Hong	  Kong.	  	  
124	  See,	  eg,	  Controlling	  Officer’s	  Report:	  Head	  80	  –	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  (February	  2016)	  
<www.budget.gov.hk/2016/eng/pdf/head080.pdf>	  accessed	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  2016.	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  Wesley-­‐Smith	  (n	  68	  above)	  121.	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  See	  note	  79	  above.	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  See	  LegCo	  papers	  <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-­‐10/english/panels/ajls/papers/aj1123cb2-­‐308-­‐4-­‐e.pdf>	  and	  
<http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-­‐02/english/panels/ajls/papers/ajcb2-­‐paj-­‐e.pdf>	  accessed	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  2016.	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subcommittee to consider the matter in greater detail.128 Finally, the motion to endorse the 
proposed appointment will be moved and voted on in LegCo.   
Chief Justice Andrew Li spoke of this LegCo procedure in his last annual address at the 
Opening of the Legal Year (2010):  
‘It is essential to judicial independence that the process of judicial appointment should 
never be politicised. In our jurisdiction, it has not been politicised and I trust that it will 
never be. This includes the endorsement process in the Legislative Council for the most 
senior judicial appointments. I am glad to see that the Legislative Council has adopted a 
procedure for dealing with endorsement which ensures that whilst enabling it to discharge 
its duty, the process is not politicised.  I am confident that the Council will continue to deal 
with the process of endorsement without politicising it.’129  
 Finally, it is noteworthy that the Rules of Procedure of LegCo contain several rules 
restricting questions or speech relating to the Judiciary. ‘A question shall not reflect on the 
decision of a court of law or be so drafted as to be likely to prejudice a case pending in a court of 
law.’130 Speeches made in LegCo may not refer to a pending case in such a way as might 
prejudice that case, nor may such speeches raise issues of the conduct of judges or other persons 
performing judicial functions.131 
Rules of bias and recusal 
          The law of the rule against bias and judicial recusal in Hong Kong is largely identical to 
that in common law jurisdictions such as England and Australia. The Guide to Judicial Conduct 
mentioned above provides for disqualification of judges in circumstances of ‘actual bias’, 
‘presumed bias’ and ‘apparent bias’.132 Legislation expressly provides that no judge shall sit in 
the CA on the hearing of any appeal from his own judicial decision.133 The leading cases on bias 
and recusal include Deacons v White & Case134 and Falcon135. The CFA and the CA held 
respectively in these cases that the test for apparent bias for the purpose of recusal is that of 
‘reasonable apprehension of bias’: would a ‘reasonable, fair-minded and well-informed observer’ 
believe that, given the circumstances, there is a reasonable possibility that the judge would be 
biased and closed to persuasion by counsel? Applications for recusal are made to the judge 
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  NPJs	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  the	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  D	  (paras	  38-­‐70)	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  High	  Court	  Ordinance,	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  34(3),	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  [2004]	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  HKLRD	  291.	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  [2014]	  3	  HKLRD	  375.	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hearing the case who is alleged to be subject to actual or apparent bias, and the judge’s decision 
on the application may be appealed to a higher court.136   
Contempt of court by ‘scandalising the court’ 
Hong Kong law has inherited the common law of contempt of court. One way in which 
contempt may be committed is ‘scandalising the court’, which is a legal rule restricting the 
freedom of speech relating to the Judiciary. The leading case in this regard is Wong Yeung Ng v 
Secretary for Justice.137 Wong, the chief editor of Oriental Daily, a popular newspaper in Hong 
Kong, was convicted on two counts of contempt of court and sentenced to four months’ 
imprisonment.138 He appealed to the CA and challenged the law of contempt of court on the ground 
that it violated the constitutionally protected freedom of expression and freedom of press. The two 
counts of contempt of court relate respectively to a series of articles published in the newspaper 
vehemently attacking the Judiciary in abusive and scurrilous language (for alleged biased decisions 
against and political persecution of the Oriental Daily newspaper) and a 24-hour ‘paparazzi’ type 
pursuit and surveillance of a High Court judge conducted by reporters and of the newspaper for 
three consecutive days (purportedly to ‘educate’ the judge on the meaning of ‘paparazzi’ which the 
judge had allegedly referred to in his judgment on a case involving the Oriental Daily and to 
‘punish’ him for the judgment).  
 Wong’s appeal was dismissed by the CA in 1999. The court pointed out that the 
constitutionally protected freedom of expression may be restricted on the ground of, inter alia, 
‘public order (ordre public)’. It was held that this covers the due administration of justice and the 
maintenance of the authority of the Judiciary.  The court held that the restrictions on freedom of 
expression imposed by the law of contempt of court – in particular, those branches of this law 
relevant to this case that prohibit ‘scandalising the court’ and interference with the administration of 
justice as a continuing process – are justified. The court followed New Zealand case law (rather than 
the different Canadian case law) in holding that contempt is committed when the publication or 
action entails a ‘real risk’ (as distinguished from ‘real, substantial and immediate danger’ as 
suggested by the Canadian case law) that public confidence in the administration of justice will be 
undermined or the administration of justice will be interfered with. The court stressed that in 
determining what constitutes contempt of court and how to choose between varying interpretations 
thereof in overseas case law, the local circumstances of Hong Kong should be taken into account. In 
this regard the court referred to ‘the relatively small size of Hong Kong’s legal system’, the ease of 
‘communication with a very substantial proportion of the population’, the ‘special importance’ in 
Hong Kong of ‘confidence in our legal system, the maintenance of the rule of law and the authority 
of the court’, the ‘frequent, if misconceived, expressions of anxiety in this respect’, and the fact that 
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‘the ordinary citizen in Hong Kong regards the court as his ultimate and sure refuge from injustice 
and oppression’.139 
Judges and free speech 
 Following the practice in other common law jurisdictions, the Guide to Judicial Conduct 
in Hong Kong provides that ‘[a] judge should avoid expressing views on controversial legal 
issues which are likely to come before the courts in a way which may impair the judge’s ability 
to sit’.140 This formulation is relatively narrow and does not state generally that judges should 
refrain from commenting publicly in an extrajudicial capacity on social, political or policy issues. 
The Guide also provides that ‘[t]here is no objection to judges contributing to legal and 
professional education such as by delivering lectures, teaching, participating in conferences and 
seminars … contributing to legal texts. … such professional activities by judges are in the public 
interest and are to be encouraged.’141  
 At the annual ceremonial Opening of the Legal Year, the Chief Justice makes a speech 
which provides an opportunity for him as head of the Judiciary to comment on current issues 
relevant to the Judiciary and the Rule of Law in Hong Kong. For example, both Chief Justice Li, 
the first CJ of the HKSAR, and Chief Justice Ma, the second CJ, have stated in their Opening of 
the Legal Year addresses that in exercising the power of judicial review, Hong Kong courts only 
adjudicate in accordance with the law, and the courts are not the proper forum for resolving 
controversial political and policy issues.142 Apart from the Chief Justice speaking in this capacity, 
there were a few rare instances where judges or retired judges in Hong Kong have made public 
comments on controversial legal issues. For example, a High Court judge wrote to a newspaper 
in 1999 criticising the Government for referring the ‘right of abode’ issue to the NPCSC for 
interpretation.143 Justice Bokhary, on the occasion of his retirement as Permanent Judge of the 
CFA, made a widely publicised comment on a possible storm coming in Hong Kong’s legal 
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  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  problems	  cannot	  be	  found	  
through	  the	  legal	  process	  and	  can	  only	  be	  found	  through	  the	  political	  process.’	  In	  both	  speeches,	  the	  principle	  of	  
judicial	  independence	  was	  emphasised.	  	  
143	  This	  incident	  is	  referred	  to	  in	  Cottrell	  and	  Ghai	  (n	  1	  above)	  227.	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system.144 Justice Litton, retired judge of the CFA, criticised litigants’ abuse of the process of 
judicial review in politicised matters.145   
Judges and non-judicial functions 
 Various statutes in Hong Kong enable the executive to appoint judges to various offices 
outside the Judiciary. The policies or rationales behind these statutory provisions vary from 
utilising judges’ expertise146 to making use of their reputation or skills of independence and 
fairness.147 On many occasions, judges were appointed to chair or sit alone in commissions of 
inquiry even though it is not necessary under the relevant Ordinance for a judge to be 
appointed.148 At other times, a judge would be appointed to chair a non-statutory panel to inquire 
into a matter of public concern.149 While commissions or panels of inquiry are fact-finding, 
deliberative and at arms-length from the Administration, other appointments are adjudicative, 
determinative or more integrated with the machinery of administration of an area of government 
policy. Chief Justice Li felt obliged to address the issue in his Opening of the Legal Year speech 
on 12 January 2009. He indicated that the usual position is that if the Judiciary was asked to 
provide judges to undertake work outside the court system, extra resources would be made 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144	  He	  said	  that	  ‘For	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  I	  see	  –	  much	  as	  I	  wish	  that	  I	  did	  not	  see	  –	  storm	  clouds	  on	  the	  horizon.	  The	  
storm	  which	  they	  threaten	  is	  a	  storm	  of	  unprecedented	  ferocity’:	  (2012)	  15	  HKCFA	  861	  at	  866-­‐7.	  	  
145	  Allen	  Au-­‐yeung	  and	  Julie	  Chu,	  ‘Hong	  Kong’s	  legal	  system	  sleepwalking	  to	  2047,	  says	  former	  top	  judge	  Henry	  
Litton’,	  South	  China	  Morning	  Post,	  3	  Dec	  2015.	  	  
146	  Examples	  include	  the	  Higher	  Rights	  Assessment	  Board	  under	  s	  39E	  of	  the	  Legal	  Practitioners	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  
159),	  and	  the	  Long-­‐Term	  Prison	  Sentences	  Review	  Board	  under	  s	  6	  of	  the	  Long-­‐Term	  Prison	  Sentences	  Review	  
Ordinance	  (Cap	  524).	  
147	  Examples	  include	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Electoral	  Affairs	  Commission	  under	  s	  3	  of	  the	  Electoral	  Affairs	  
Commission	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  541),	  and	  the	  Returning	  Officer	  in	  a	  Chief	  Executive	  election	  under	  s	  41	  of	  the	  Chief	  
Executive	  Election	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  569).	  
148	  The	  Governor	  was	  empowered	  by	  statute	  since	  1886	  to	  appoint	  commissioners	  to	  conduct	  inquiries,	  with	  the	  
commissioners	  so	  appointed	  having	  the	  powers,	  rights	  and	  privileges	  of	  a	  court	  or	  vested	  in	  any	  judge.	  A	  total	  of	  16	  
commissions	  of	  inquiry	  have	  been	  appointed	  since	  1966,	  either	  under	  the	  Commissioners	  Powers	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  
86,	  1964	  Ed)	  or	  the	  Commissions	  of	  Inquiry	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  86).	  	  A	  majority	  of	  them	  were	  chaired	  by	  a	  judge.	  They	  
included	  the	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  into	  Kowloon	  Disturbances	  1966	  (chaired	  by	  Hogan	  CJ),	  the	  Commission	  of	  
Inquiry	  into	  the	  Rainstorm	  Disasters	  1972	  (chaired	  by	  District	  Judge	  T	  L	  Yang),	  the	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  
Case	  of	  Peter	  Fitzroy	  Godber	  (conducted	  by	  Blair-­‐Kerr	  J,	  1973),	  the	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  into	  Inspector	  
MacLennan’s	  Case	  (conducted	  by	  Yang	  J,	  1980),	  the	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  into	  Witness	  Protection	  (conducted	  by	  
Kempster	  VP,	  1993),	  the	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  Garley	  Building	  Fire	  (conducted	  by	  Woo	  J,	  1996),	  the	  
Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  into	  Airport	  Opening	  (chaired	  by	  Woo	  J,	  1998),	  the	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  on	  Allegations	  
relating	  to	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  Institute	  of	  Education	  (chaired	  by	  Yeung	  JA,	  2007),	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  into	  the	  
Collision	  of	  Vessels	  near	  Lamma	  Island	  on	  1	  October	  2012	  (chaired	  by	  Lunn	  JA),	  and	  the	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  into	  
Excess	  Lead	  Found	  in	  Drinking	  Water	  (chaired	  by	  Andrew	  Chan	  J,	  2015-­‐16).	  	  
149	  A	  board	  of	  inquiry	  consisting	  of	  Puisne	  Judge	  Paul	  Cressall	  was	  established	  in	  1941	  to	  investigate	  into	  allegations	  
of	  corruption	  and	  abuse	  within	  the	  Air	  Raid	  Precaution	  Department;	  see	  Kwong	  Chi	  Man	  and	  Tsoi	  Yiu	  Lun,	  Eastern	  
Fortress:	  A	  Military	  History	  of	  Hong	  Kong,	  1840-­‐1970	  (Hong	  Kong	  University	  Press,	  2014)	  157.	  Recent	  examples	  
include	  the	  inquiry	  into	  the	  Lan	  Kwai	  Fong	  Disaster	  (conducted	  by	  Bokhary	  J,	  1993),	  the	  inquiry	  on	  the	  Sai	  Wan	  Ho	  
Development	  (chaired	  by	  Mortimer	  NPJ,	  2005),	  and	  the	  Independent	  Expert	  Panel	  on	  the	  Hong	  Kong	  Section	  of	  the	  
Guangzhou-­‐Shenzhen-­‐Hong	  Kong	  Express	  Rail	  Link	  (chaired	  by	  Hartmann	  NPJ,	  2014).	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available to the Judiciary to create more judicial posts or employ more deputy judges. He also 
stated the following policy:   
‘First, the Judiciary has not sought such work for itself.  But where the Administration, 
reflecting community consensus, proposes legislation prescribing the appointment of a 
serving judge to a particular office, provided the Judiciary is satisfied that there is no 
objection in principle, it would be prepared to make a judge available upon enactment of 
the legislation by the Legislature. …  Secondly, for all offices outside the Judiciary …  
where the relevant statute provides for serving judges and other categories of persons to 
be eligible for appointment, … the Judiciary’s approach in recent years has been to 
request the Administration to look for a suitable person who is not a serving judge and to 
agree to make a serving judge available only where no other suitable person is 
available.’150 
 This statement does not however address several anomalies or incompatibilities from the 
perspective of separation of powers. The first concerns the mixed functions of the Obscene 
Articles Tribunal, a tribunal under the Judiciary. Publishers, distributors, importers, copyright 
owners, the Secretary for Justice and law enforcement agencies may access the tribunal at any 
time to obtain a classification of the nature of an article (as regards whether it is obscene or 
indecent) either to assist the subsequent publication of the article or to provide reference to any 
contemplated prosecution.151 In a submission to the Government during its consultation exercise 
on the review of the tribunal, the Judiciary pointed out that the tribunal’s administrative 
classification function and its function of judicial determination152 (the latter of which forms part 
of criminal or civil proceedings raising an issue on the obscenity or indecency of the article) are 
‘distinct functions’, and it is ‘inappropriate and unsatisfactory’ for them to be performed by the 
same body.153 However, the Government has not proposed any changes to the tribunal to date.154  
 The second anomaly relates to the Market Misconduct Tribunal, a statutory tribunal 
consisting of a chairman (who must be a judge or former judge of the High Court) and two 
members established to inquire into, determine and provide sanctions for misconduct in the 
financial markets.155 The tribunal hears allegations of market misconduct presented on behalf of 
the Securities and Futures Commission; sanctions that the tribunal may impose include 
disqualification orders, ‘cold shoulder’ orders, prohibition orders and disgorgement of profit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150	  Chief	  Justice’s	  Speech	  at	  the	  Opening	  of	  the	  Legal	  Year	  2009	  (12	  January	  2009)	  
<http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200901/12/P200901120166.htm>	  accessed	  20	  Mar	  2016.	  
151	  See	  Control	  of	  Obscene	  and	  Indecent	  Articles	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  390)	  Pt	  III.	  
152	  See,	  ibid,	  Pt	  IV.	  
153	  See	  ‘The	  Review	  of	  the	  Control	  of	  Obscene	  and	  Indecent	  Articles	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  390)	  –	  The	  Judiciary’s	  
Response’	  (November	  2008)	  <http://www.judiciary.gov.hk/en/publications/coia_judiciary_response.pdf>	  accessed	  
20	  Mar	  2016.	  
154	  See	  Lo	  Pui	  Yin,	  The	  Judicial	  Construction	  of	  Hong	  Kong’s	  Basic	  Law:	  Courts,	  Politics	  and	  Society	  after	  1997	  (Hong	  
Kong	  University	  Press,	  2014)	  246.	  
155	  See	  the	  Securities	  and	  Futures	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  571)	  Pt	  XIII.	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orders.156 It had been argued that the tribunal was a court in all but name, exercising judicial 
power without being subject to the constraints placed upon a court that protect defendants’ 
procedural rights. This argument, citing extensively Australian jurisprudence, was rejected by the 
Court of First Instance, which held that the tribunal was established to perform a regulatory and 
protective role in Hong Kong’s financial markets and did not oust the jurisdiction of the criminal 
courts in Hong Kong or usurp their function.157  
 The third anomaly concerns the appointment of ‘panel judges’ (who are all judges of the 
CFI) under the Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance to authorize 
interception of telecommunications or mail or surveillance.158 There are similar regimes overseas, 
and judges’ authorisations in the context of interception of communications and surveillance may 
be compared with magistrates issuing search warrants.159 On the other hand, it has been argued 
that the employment of selected judges to perform in private a non-judicial function, while 
having the same power, protection and immunities of a judge in relation to judicial 
proceedings,160 creates questions of consistency with the separation of power principle, as well 
as those on the capacity and integrity of the panel judges to continue to perform their judicial 
functions.161 The lingering concern involves the borrowing of the Judiciary’s reputation ‘by the 
political Branches to cloak their work in the neutral colours of judicial action’.162 
Conclusion 
 The Rule of Law in Hong Kong has been highly evaluated internationally,163 and this 
includes international and local recognition that there is an independent and well-functioning 
judiciary in Hong Kong that is free from corruption and enjoys the confidence of the community. 
The legal system of colonial Hong Kong was far from perfect, but the values of the Rule of Law, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156	  See,	  ibid,	  ss	  257,	  258.	  
157	  Luk	  Ka	  Cheung	  v	  Market	  Misconduct	  Tribunal	  &	  Anor	  [2009]	  1	  HKLRD	  114,	  CFI,	  relying	  on	  the	  words	  of	  Sir	  
Anthony	  Mason	  NPJ	  to	  avoid	  the	  application	  of	  the	  strict	  logic	  of	  separation	  of	  powers	  in	  Australia.	  See	  also	  
Anthony	  Mason,	  ‘The	  Place	  of	  Comparative	  Law	  in	  Development	  the	  Jurisprudence	  on	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law	  and	  Human	  
Rights	  in	  Hong	  Kong’	  (2007)	  37	  Hong	  Kong	  Law	  Journal	  299.	  
158	  Interception	  of	  Communications	  and	  Surveillance	  Ordinance	  (Cap	  589),	  Pt	  3,	  Div	  2.	  
159	  See	  the	  Telecommunications	  (interception	  and	  Access)	  Act	  1979	  (Aust	  Cth)	  and	  the	  Surveillance	  Devices	  Act	  
2004	  (Aust	  Cth).	  
160	  See	  the	  Interception	  of	  Communications	  and	  Surveillance	  Ordinance,	  s	  6(4).	  	  
161	  See	  Hong	  Kong	  Bar	  Association,	  ‘Interception	  of	  Communications	  and	  Surveillance	  Bill’	  (March	  2006)	  
<http://www.hkba.org/whatsnew/submission-­‐position-­‐papers/2006/20060324.pdf>	  accessed	  20	  Mar	  2016,	  citing	  
Grollo	  v	  Palmer	  (1995)	  184	  CLR	  348	  (HC	  Aust).	  
162	  See	  Mistretta	  v	  United	  States	  488	  US	  361	  (1989)	  at	  407	  (per	  Blackmun	  J).	  
163	  According	  to	  the	  World	  Justice	  Project’s	  ‘WJP	  Rule	  of	  Law	  Index	  2015’	  
<http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/roli_2015_0.pdf>	  accessed	  20	  Mar	  2016,	  Hong	  Kong	  (HKSAR)	  
ranked	  17th	  among	  102	  countries,	  with	  a	  score	  of	  0.76.	  For	  comparison,	  it	  may	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  UK	  ranked	  12th	  
(score	  of	  0.78),	  and	  the	  US	  19th	  (score	  of	  0.73).	  According	  to	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  ‘Worldwide	  Governance	  Indicators’	  
<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/databases/governance-­‐effectiveness>	  accessed	  20	  Mar	  2016,	  in	  2014,	  the	  
score	  for	  ‘Rule	  of	  Law:	  percentile	  rank’	  for	  Hong	  Kong	  was	  93.8,	  while	  the	  corresponding	  scores	  for	  the	  UK,	  the	  US	  
and	  China	  were	  respectively	  94.2,	  89.9	  and	  42.8.	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judicial independence and judicial integrity have been successfully implanted on Hong Kong soil. 
Such values continue to be cherished and defended after the handover in 1997. As discussed in 
this chapter in the context of the ‘syndrome of One Country Two Systems’, the legal and 
political communities and members of the public in Hong Kong have been vigilant in ensuring 
that the cherished values of legality and judicial independence would not be subject to erosion or 
interference by Beijing or other mainland authorities.  
 This chapter has identified some features of Hong Kong’s judicial system that may be 
considered significant from a comparative perspective. (1) Under the peculiar legal arrangement 
of ‘One Country Two Systems’, the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) enjoys the power of final 
adjudication, but the NPCSC of the PRC reserves the overriding power to issue legislative 
interpretations of the Basic Law of the HKSAR. (2) The CFA is partly staffed by overseas judges 
from the UK, Australia and New Zealand, who play a significant role in the CFA’s work. (3) 
Hong Kong operates a bilingual legal and judicial system which is staffed by both Chinese-
speaking and non-Chinese speaking expatriate judges at various levels of the court system. (4) 
Most judicial appointments are made by the Chief Executive acting on the recommendations of 
an independent Judicial Officers Recommendation Commission. The legislature has the power to 
endorse the most senior judicial appointments. This system of judicial appointments has worked 
well so far and no politicisation has occurred. (5) Judges enjoy security of tenure and financial 
security, and there exists a well-functioning mechanism for the determination of judicial 
remuneration. (6) A Guide to Judicial Conduct has been promulgated on the basis of similar 
guides in other common law jurisdictions. (7) ‘Non-regular’ judges, including temporary or part-
time judges, play a significant role in Hong Kong’s judicial system. (8) The Chief Justice is the 
most important office of, and plays a pivotal role in, Hong Kong’s judicial system, given his 
overall responsibility for the administration of the judiciary, and various powers he has, for 
example, regarding the management of the CFA and the appointment of ‘non-regular’ judges at 
various levels of the court system. (9) The law and practice in Hong Kong regarding rules of bias 
and recusal, contempt of court and judges’ speech are similar to their counterparts in other 
common law jurisdictions. (10) As in other common law jurisdictions, Hong Kong judges have 
been appointed to perform significant non-judicial functions.  
 Reflecting on the research we did in the course of the writing of this chapter, we feel that 
the Rule of Law, particularly those components of it that relate to the judiciary, is ultimately not 
only a matter of institutions and rules, but also a matter of persons, personalities and personal 
character. The judicial system of the HKSAR has been fortunately blessed by having Chief 
Justices and judges of integrity, who understand the values of the Rule of Law and judicial 
independence, and the challenges faced by them in the peculiar context of ‘One Country Two 
Systems’. It is to be hoped that their successors will continue their good work, so that the Rule of 
Law and judicial independence will continue to flourish in this HKSAR of the PRC. 
